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1. Introduction 
Although aquaculture as been practised for many centuries, it was in the past on quite a 
modest scale and limited to a few species e.g. carp. However, in recent decades, 
aquaculture has shown very rapid expansion. This is partly because catches of wild fish 
have expanded at a slower rate than demand and many new scientific and technological 
advances have been made in aquaculture. Furthermore, by the mid-1990s evidence 
available to scientists indicated that catches of wild fish had either reached, nearly 
reached or even exceeded their sustainable limits (Williams, 1997). Consequently, 
according to Meryl Williams (1997, p.18), Director of ICLARM, now “aquaculture is 
the major, though not sole hope, for improving the world’s fish production”. 
Aquaculture, particularly marine aquaculture, has become a new economic frontier. 
Just as humankind in the past experienced the Agricultural Revolution it seems now to 
be starting on an Aquaculture Revolution. Naturally, this raises the question of how 
sustainable it will be. 
 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the sustainability of aquaculture production. If 
expanded aquaculture production sets into motion forces that make it unsustainable, 
economic development based on it will be short lived. One should at least be aware 
how lack of economic sustainability of aquaculture production can arise, and be 
prepared to adopt policies to curb or prevent undesired trends in this. 
 
In this article, it is pointed out that (a) factors endogenous to the productive unit and (b) 
factors exogenous to individual productive units (such as environmental spillovers or 
externalities) and result in the unsustainable development of aquaculture. However, 
most attention in this article is given to adverse environmental spillovers as a 
contributor to lack of sustainability of aquaculture. This is because lack of 
sustainability in the endogenous case results from the rational choice of businesses 
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involved in aquaculture whereas the outcome when externalities exist can be inferior 
from the point of view of all or from a social viewpoint. There is consideration of the 
relative sustainability of extensive aquaculture systems versus intensive ones, and of 
the impact of aquaculture on the sustainability of natural fish stocks. Policies for 
regulating environmental spillovers to achieve a social economic gain, and thereby in 
most cases promote greater sustainability of aquaculture, are outlined and discussed. By 
concentrating on a particular sector, it is possible to identify various policy issues raised 
by the quest for sustainable development that may be overlooked in a macroeconomic 
context. 
 
2. Lack of Sustainability in the Absence of Market Factors 
Even when markets work perfectly and market failures, such as may arise from 
environmental spillovers are absent, unsustainable income paths may be chosen by 
economic agents in preference to sustainable ones (for details see Tisdell, 1999). Profit-
maximising or income-maximising behaviour by individuals or business need not result 
in paths of sustainable income or of sustainable economic activity being chosen by 
them. This is so even when they are fully informed and rational. 
 
In Asia, for example, landholders often decide to farm shrimp knowing that this activity 
is unsustainable in the long run and that eventually their income will fall (Be, 1999; 
Alauddin and Tisdell, 1998). This choice can be illustrated by Figure 1. It is assumed 
that if only rice is grown on a farm that the net income path GCH will apply, This is a 
sustainable income path. If, on the other hand, shrimp is raised on the land the 
unsustainable net income path ABCDF applies. At time t2, production of shrimp ceases 
because of falling shrimp yields for instance due to mineralisation in the fish ponds and 
the land may be then too barren to grow rice or other crops. But if the landholder 
discounts the future strongly enough because of uncertainty or a high interest rate, the 
net present value of the income from the unsustainable path may well be in excess of 
the from the sustainable path. Therefore, lack of income sustainability is chosen in 
preference to sustainability. This is even more likely if the land is not rendered barren 
by shrimp cultivation and so will still grow a crop, such as rice, when shrimp 
production stops, albeit with much reduced yield compared to the situation in which no 
shrimp cultivation occurs. In such a case, the alternative to the sustainable income path 
might be path ABCJ. 
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Figure 1  Rational individuals or businesses may choose unsustainable income paths in 
preference to sustainable ones in their use of land. 
 
It seems that individuals are more likely to choose unsustainable paths for resource-use 
when they leave greater scope for mobility or access to markets. Subsistence villagers 
with virtually no access to markets and with little mobility are more likely to choose 
sustainable income paths as argued by Tisdell (1990, Ch.2). As outlined by Klee (1980, 
Ch.1), a similar point has been made by the geographer Raymond Dassman, namely 
that less sustainable systems are likely to be chosen as individuals change from a 
village to a global perspective as a result of the extension of markets. 
 
But in any case, it ought to be clear that a perfectly working market system does not 
ensure sustainability of land use. Whether or not such sustainability is desirable is, 
however, a subject for debate. For example, sustainable income paths are more likely to 
be chosen if a zero or low discount rate is applied to future income, a policy favoured 
by economists such as Frank Ramsey and A. C. Pigou (Howe, 1979, p.156). 
 
3. Environmental Spillovers as a Source of Inferior Sustainability Outcomes 
As shown above, lack of economic sustainability in an industry or business program 
can even arise in the absence of market failures. But market failures can increase the 
likelihood of unsustainable economic outcomes (see Tisdell, 1999). More importantly 
they can result in unwanted lack of economic sustainability on the part of all, in 
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contrast to the case just discussed in which unsustainable income paths may be chosen 
rationally. Environmental spillovers or externalities, such as these arising in 
aquaculture, can be used to illustrate the matter. 
 
Consider the case of unfavourable externalities or environmental spillovers. When 
these arise the private costs of producers such as fish farmers are less than the cost to 
society of their production. Consequently their private benefits from production 
exceeds its social benefits. This can result in private choices, by fish farmers in this 
case, resulting in an excessive level of economic production from a social economic 
point of view. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Te curve 0AB represents the private 
benefit or returns to fish farmers in a region and curve 0CDE indicates social benefits. 
Due to unfavourable externalities, curve 0CDE is below curve 0AB. The difference 
between these two curves measures externality costs. In the absence of control, fish 
farmers in the region will produce X2 of farmed fish whereas X1 is optimal from a 
social viewpoint. Market failure occurs and there can be a case for government 
intervention. 
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Figure 2  A case in which an unfavourable environmental spillover results in its market 
failing to bring about a social economic optimum. 
 
While environmental spillovers in the above case reduce the attainable level of social 
economic welfare, in some cases they may still result in sustainable social economic 
benefit, albeit it at an inferior level. However, in many cases, environmental spillovers 
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result in individual producers not taking into account the full user costs of their actions, 
that is, their full impact on future incomes. For example, in drawing water from a 
shared water body or adding pollutants to it, each producer may consider his-her 
individual impact on the future availability of the water and it purity to be negligible. 
However, collectively this is not the case. Thus the natural resource may be utilized at 
an unsustainable rate. An unsustainable income path may be followed by all users of 
the resource that, from the point of view of each one, is less desirable than an available 
alternative involving greater prudence in their use of the resource. Hence, the presence 
of the environmental externality promotes lack of economic sustainability and result sin 
a Paretian inferior result. In game theory parlance, a prisoners’ dilemma type of 
problem exist and the consequence is that a socially inferior Nash equilibrium 
eventuates. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 3. A community using a natural resource may have the 
possibility of following path I, a sustainable income path, or path II an unsustainable 
income path. All may prefer I to II. However, because of the presence of adverse 
environmental externalities resulting in inadequate consideration of user costs by 
individual producers, path II may be followed. Or, possibly the community has a third 
possible path that it prefers, marked III. Although this path does not result in a 
sustainable level of income, it sustains income at a higher level than path II. 
Nevertheless, the presence of externalities could still result in the private uncoordinated 
choice of path II. 
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Figure 3  Environmental spillovers can result in less sustainable income paths and 
socially inferior ones being followed in a community. 
 
Thus it is clear that the presence of adverse environmental externalities can both reduce 
social economic benefits and prevent the desired social sustainability of these benefits 
being attained. 
 
4.  Specific Observations on Environmental Spillovers, Sustainability and 
Aquaculture Development 
Depending upon the type of aquaculture practised and other circumstances, aquaculture 
can have positive or negative environmental spillovers, or no significant spillovers. 
Table 1 lists some possible adverse environmental externalities from aquaculture. 
These range from pollution of underground and other water supplies, land subsidence 
due to withdrawal of underground water, reduced stocks of wild fish used for 
commercial or subsistence purposes, loss of recreational space, greater spread of 
diseases associated with farmed species and increased resistance of disease-causing 
organism as a result of medication e.g. antibiotics, used in aquaculture. 
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Table 1 Types of agency and transaction costs involved in environmental regulations 
and the consequential economic impacts of such regulations 
POLICY FACTOR OR 
IMPACT 
COMMENT 
Agency and associated 
transaction-type costs 
 
1. Administrative outlays  Such as salaries for the general staff of the agency.  
2. Monitoring or inspection 
costs 
These policing costs can be high. 
3. Enforcement costs These include the legal costs of enforcement. 
4. Political capture The regulated may politically capture or influence 
the regulators. Regulators may prefer a quiet life 
and may not enforce the regulations rigorously. 
5. Bribery  Regulators may take bribes and ignore 
infringements. 
6. Imperfect information Regulators have bounded rationality and thus have 
to act on imperfect information. Regulations may 
be inadequately drafted and values of policy 
instruments may be inappropriate. 
7. Adaptability or flexibility of 
regulations 
As economic and environmental conditions change, 
variations in policy may be necessary. Are the 
regulations adequate in that regard? 
8. Uncertainty of regulations 
for the regulated  
Uncertainty about the rights and obligations of the 
regulated and about enforcement of regulations may 
add to the costs of those regulated. 
Transaction-type costs 
involved in private-property 
type of situations 
 
9. Negotiation costs Note that many of these costs are similar in nature 
to those incurred by agencies but they fall on 
private individuals in this case. 
10. Monitoring, inspection and 
enforcement costs. 
 
11. Imperfect information of the 
parties involved. 
Asymmetry of information 
Consequential economic 
impacts 
 
12. Allocative economic 
efficiency  
To what extent do the regulations improve 
allocative economic efficiency, for example, bring 
private marginal cost into line with social marginal 
cost? 
13. Change in income 
distribution 
Different regulations have dissimilar impacts on 
income distribution. This should be taken into 
account. 
14. Consequences for 'dynamic' 
efficiency - evolutionary 
impacts 
How do the regulations affect technological 
progress, especially whether they encourage the 
development of technology for pollution 
abatement? Do the regulations encourage the 
development of environmental management skills? 
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In the light of the debate about strong or weak conditions for sustainable development, 
it is interesting to speculate about whether intensive or extensive aquaculture is likely 
to cause greater environmental damage. Intensive systems usually involve high man-
made capital to land ratios and high man-made to labour ratios. It may also be that 
intensive systems are more likely to be closed or nearly closed so reducing their 
interdependence with natural environments. Thus, it is possible for intensive systems to 
be environmentally friendlier than extensive ones. In many cases, they probably have 
lower adverse environmental externalities for the same level of output. Therefore, in 
several circumstances, they could result in greater conservation of natural resources. 
For example, extensive farming of shrimp, as practised in Bangladesh and some other 
developing countries, although (appropriately) reflecting local relative abundance of 
man-made capital and labour, can be highly destructive of natural environments. Low-
tech methods and methods with low man-made capital requirements in relation to other 
resources do not always foster sustainable development. Frequently these methods  
cause a high level of environmental destruction because they are actually require 
considerable utilisation of natural resource in relation to man-made capital. While 
superficially extensive production methods may at first seem to accord with strong 
conditions for sustainable development, in reality they often fall into the category 
involving weak conditions. While few natural resources may be converted directly into 
the man-made capital when using such techniques, the use of natural resource capital 
relative to man-made capital can be high when extensive production methods are 
employed because their adverse environmental spillovers seriously reduce natural 
capital stocks. However, as pointed out in Tisdell (1997a) the position is complex. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile linking macroeconomic requirements for sustainable 
development with microeconomic applications for it is at the microeconomic level that 
development policies are really put into practice. 
 
I do not wish to give the impression that aquaculture is always environmentally 
unfriendly or that it always hinders sustainable development. In some circumstances, 
aquaculture can have very positive sustainability consequences. As Anderson (1985) 
points out aquaculture can increase the sustainability of wild stocks of fish and other 
gathered organisms by increasing supplies and reducing harvesting pressure. Such a 
favourable case is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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In Figure 4, the backward bending curve ABC represents the wild-caught supply of a 
fish species. It bends backward because, after some degree of harvesting effort is 
exceeded, available natural stocks of the fish fall significantly so increasing the per unit 
cost of their capture. The line DF represents the demand curve for this fish. In the 
absence of its aquaculture, market equilibrium is established at E1 with the fish selling 
at P2 per unit and with X1 being supplied annually. 
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Figure 4  In some cases, farming or aquaculture favours the sustainability of the 
farmed species in the wild.  
 
Now suppose that aquaculture of the wild-caught species becomes possible and that the 
total annual supply of it from farming and capture is as shown by AGH in Figure 4. If 
the captures and the farmed suppliers are perfect substitutes, a new market equilibrium 
is established at E2. The market price of this farmed species falls from P1 to P2 and tis 
supply expands from X1 to X2. X3 – X2 of the increased supply is accounted for by 
aquaculture and X2 – X1 arises as a result of greater supply from the capture fishery. 
The latter occurs because a fall in market price reduces harvesting effort. Hence, 
natural stocks of the fish increase and per-unit and cost of capture declines. Thus in this 
case, the aquaculture is environmentally favourable.  
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However, the matter is much more complicated in practice, and in some cases an 
unfavourable environmental results eventuate from farming. This can occur via two 
different mechanisms. Aquaculture may stimulate the demand for the farmed species 
causing the market demand curves for supplies of the farmed species to shift upwards. 
Secondly, it may cause a shift to the left of the supply curve at wild-caught fish for 
reasons partly highlighted in Table 1. It may reduce the natural resources available to 
wild fish populations e.g. as a result of wetland destruction, lower their population by 
their capture at an immature stage to provide seedstock or fingerlings, and by other 
mechanisms. 
 
This means that considerable care is needed in assessing each aquaculture situation for 
its sustainability implications. Hasty generalisation should be avoided. 
 
Some other ways in which aquaculture can have positive environmental spillovers and 
add to sustainability might be noted.  Fish farming is, for example, possible in 
conjunction with artificial wetlands.  Such wetlands have been successfully used to 
reduce nutrient loads in water-bodies. Polyculture and appropriate combinations of 
agriculture and aquaculture can also be used to lower nutrient-loads entering common 
water bodies from private property. In Calcutta, fish aquaculture is engaged in in ponds 
and supplied with the city’s sewage. Thus, aquaculture in this case assists with sewage-
disposal and helps reduce biological oxygen demand in common waters. Furthermore, 
when agriculturalists engage in fish culture in farm ponds and dams, they are less likely 
to use dangerous agricultural pesticides and chemical fertilizers capable of adverse 
externalities on fish production. Scope exists for expanding the development of 
aquaculture for beneficial environmental spillovers but more research is needed in that 
regard. Since aquaculture includes botanic species, they should also be considered. In 
this respect, note that seaweeds and some molluscs can utilise the nutrients in nutrient-
rich seawater and so could reduce dangers of red-tides and other unwanted 
environmental effects. 
 
5. Regulating Adverse Environmental Spillovers from Aquaculture – General 
Considerations 
Environmental externalities are generated by many social and economic activities, and 
aquaculture is both a source and a victim of several such adverse spillovers (Tisdell, 
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1994; Shang and Tisdell, 1997). As is clear from the above discussion, unfavourable 
externalities threaten sustainable development and are often sources of economic 
inefficiency and market failure. Their control can help to sustain economies 
development and improve the ability of economies to satisfy human wants. 
 
Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised before deciding to regulate 
environmental spillovers from aquaculture. It should be borne in mind that economic 
regulation is not costless, is likely to be imperfect, and different policy instruments 
often have divergent side-effects, some of which may be unwanted. Furthermore, the 
economic impact of environmental regulation is liable to vary with the attribute of 
production to which the controls are applied. For example, impacts vary depending 
upon whether regulations are applied to inputs, outputs or emissions from productive 
activity. 
 
In assessing alternative policy instruments for the control of spillovers from 
aquaculture, account must be taken of the comparative agency costs involved in each 
and limitations on the knowledge available to policy-makers.  The relative adaptability 
of alternative policy instruments to changing circumstances also needs to be 
considered.  As discussed here, these and other factors influence the practicality of 
using alternative policy instruments to regulate environmental externalities from 
aquaculture and achieve sustainable outcomes. 
 
An economic system is only fully efficient if the relevant impacts of an economic 
agent’s activities on others are fully priced.  If this does not occur externalities or 
spillovers are said to occur.  These unpriced economic effects result in the marginal 
private net benefits obtained by economic entities from their activities (for example, 
marginal profit of aquaculturalists) diverging from the marginal social net benefits of 
these activities. In all but very exceptional cases (Tisdell, 1993, Chs. 3 & 4), this causes 
economic inefficiency and a loss of economic welfare, assuming that economic entities 
act in their own self-interest to maximise their private welfare. 
 
These externalities can in principle be addressed by policy measures in two general 
ways:  
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(i) Policy instruments such as emission taxes or trading in pollution rights may 
be used to price these thereby making them a part of the private costs or 
benefits of the economic entities involved. Economists describe this as 
internalising externalities. 
(ii) Prohibitions or limits on environmental use may be imposed.  Thus fiat, 
rather than guidance by means of pricing, is used to alter private behaviour  
Sometimes a combination of pricing and prohibitory methods may be employed. For 
example, a tax on particular types of emissions such as nitrogenous and phosphorous 
emissions from artificial fishponds, and a ban on the use of particular chemicals or 
pharmaceuticals in fish farming may be simultaneously imposed. 
 
Within the pricing and prohibitory approaches to regulating environmental spillovers, a 
variety of policies are possible.  These will be discussed after the broad principles of 
evaluating policies for regulating environmental spillovers in aquaculture are outlined.   
 
Broadly, economic assessment of the regulation of spillovers involves two parts: 
(i) costs and problems involved in the administration of the regulations, often 
described as agency costs, and 
(ii) consequential economic costs and impacts of the regulations. 
Agency costs can be regarded as a form of transaction costs. Even when private 
property solutions of the type suggested by Coase (1960) are adopted with a view to 
eliminating externalities by negotiation, transaction costs are involved, particularly if 
agreements need to be enforced in the courts. 
 
Policies for regulating environmental spillovers from aquaculture vary in terms of their 
agency and transaction-type of costs, and in terms of their consequential economic 
impacts.  Both sets of factors must be taken into account in assessing environmental 
regulations; a holistic approach is needed. Table 2 summarises the type of factors to be 
considered in deciding on policies to control environmental spillovers. These are 
classified into considerations arising from agency and transaction-type costs, and 
consequential impacts. These considerations are quite general and apply not just to 
aquaculture but to all economic activities giving rise to environmental spillovers. Until 
recently, economists tended to concentrate on consequential impacts giving most of 
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their attention to item 12, impacts on allocative efficiency. However, with growing 
interest in institutional economics, the other aspects are getting more attention. 
 
Table 2 Types of agency and transaction costs involved in environmental regulations 
and the consequential economic impacts of such regulations 
 
POLICY FACTOR OR 
IMPACT 
COMMENT 
Agency and associated 
transaction-type costs 
 
15. Administrative outlays  Such as salaries for the general staff of the agency.  
16. Monitoring or inspection costs These policing costs can be high. 
17. Enforcement costs These include the legal costs of enforcement. 
18. Political capture The regulated may politically capture or influence the 
regulators. Regulators may prefer a quiet life and may 
not enforce the regulations rigorously. 
19. Bribery  Regulators may take bribes and ignore infringements. 
20. Imperfect information Regulators have bounded rationality and thus have to act 
on imperfect information. Regulations may be 
inadequately drafted and values of policy instruments 
may be inappropriate. 
21. Adaptability or flexibility of 
regulations 
As economic and environmental conditions change, 
variations in policy may be necessary. Are the 
regulations adequate in that regard? 
22. Uncertainty of regulations for 
the regulated  
Uncertainty about the rights and obligations of the 
regulated and about enforcement of regulations may add 
to the costs of those regulated. 
Transaction-type costs involved 
in private-property type of 
situations 
 
23. Negotiation costs Note that many of these costs are similar in nature to 
those incurred by agencies but they fall on private 
individuals in this case. 
24. Monitoring, inspection and 
enforcement costs. 
 
25. Imperfect information of the 
parties involved. 
Asymmetry of information 
Consequential economic impacts  
26. Allocative economic 
efficiency  
To what extent do the regulations improve allocative 
economic efficiency, for example, bring private 
marginal cost into line with social marginal cost? 
27. Change in income distribution Different regulations have dissimilar impacts on income 
distribution. This should be taken into account. 
28. Consequences for 'dynamic' 
efficiency - evolutionary 
impacts 
How do the regulations affect technological progress, 
especially whether they encourage the development of 
technology for pollution abatement? Do the regulations 
encourage the development of environmental 
management skills? 
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Many methods traditionally recommended by economists for the control of 
environmental spillovers from economic activities are impractical or uneconomic for 
aquaculture, mainly because of the level of transaction costs involved. For example, 
where aquaculture is conducted in a shared water body, emissions from cages or plots 
for aquaculture are non-point and can be very difficult, if not impossible, to monitor. 
Even when aquaculture involves pond cultivation and water withdrawal from a 
common body of water with release of wastewater via a point outlet (or a few outlets), 
effective monitoring of the quality of the water released may be difficult or costly.  
Where will the aquaculture water samples be analysed, how quickly, how frequently 
will they be taken and when?  Especially when small-scale scattered aquacultural 
enterprises are involved, as is sometimes so in less developed countries, the cost of 
sampling may be high.  Furthermore, aquaculturalists may be able to time their noxious 
water releases so these do not coincide with the visit of a pollution-control inspector.  
Moreover, in some less developed countries, considerable scope exists for bribery, 
given prevailing socio-economic conditions. 
 
6.  Pricing and Market-Making Approaches to Environmental Regulation of 
Aquaculture 
In regulating environmental spillovers from aquaculture, it is important initially to 
decide which aspect of aquaculture activity is to be controlled to address an 
environmental problem. For example, is the control designed to impact on the level of 
production, stocking rates, use of inputs, on emissions of pollutants, on location of 
activities or on use of particular technologies or farming methods? Depending upon 
where the controls are applied, they are liable to have different economic consequences. 
For instance, if the emission of a particular pollutant is the main problem, limitations on 
aquaculture production levels, on stocking rates, or on inputs containing the major 
source of the pollutant will reduce emissions of the pollutant but may fail to encourage 
development of techniques to reduce its emission. Thus, these policies may be 
ineffective in encouraging dynamic or evolutionary efficiency in pollution reduction.  
Nevertheless, agency cost, involved in regulating emissions directly may be so high 
that it is not economical to do this.  Thus in Europe, stocking rates on fish farms are 
regulated in some countries and in Denmark, the nitrogen and phosphorous content of 
fish food is limited (New, 1995). However, taxation or charging for pollution emissions 
from many forms of aquaculture has proven to be impractical. 
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Economists have traditionally favoured pricing and market-making approaches to 
environmental regulation on the grounds of their allocative efficiency (Tisdell, 1993, 
Ch. 4).  Unfortunately, as is clear from Table 2, the economic value of a policy cannot 
be judged solely from its ability to promote allocative efficiency or from its 
consequential economic effects. Furthermore, the simplicity of pricing-type policies is 
lost when environmental spillovers vary in their economic impact according to their 
location, as is mostly the case in aquaculture. 
 
On the other hand, one should not be too ready to dismiss pricing approaches in favour 
of prohibitions.  In some cases, very little extra cost is involved in adopting a pricing 
approach.  Since it usually involves the ‘user-pays’ principle, the pricing approach can 
help fund the cost of administration of regulations and prevent this cost becoming an 
impost on the general state budget. Some also believe this approach is appealing 
because it can provide public funds for supporting research into methods of pollution 
reduction. 
 
For example, instead of setting an administratively upper limit to the stocking rate on 
aquacultural farms, an alternative is to impose a tax or fee on this rate.  The overall fee 
or charge should be determined to achieve the aggregate rate of environmental impact 
aimed for.  This measure enables those farmers who find higher stocking rates to be 
more economical to have these, although they would have to pay extra for this.  A 
disadvantage of this method from the point of view of the aquaculture sector is that (at 
least in the short term) it distributes income away from producers in this sector.  Hence, 
this policy may be politically unpopular from the point of view of the regulated 
industry.  Similarly, instead of regulating the maximum nutrient-content of 
manufactured fish food, one could impose a levy increasing with the nutrient-content of 
the this food. 
 
Pricing and market-making approaches to control of environmental externalities may 
involve the following: 
(i) The levying of taxes or charges on economic activities giving rise to 
environmental spillovers. 
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(ii) The payment of subsidies to producers to provide them with an incentive to 
reduce or refrain from activity resulting in adverse environmental 
spillovers. 
(iii) The marketing of pollution rights or environmental-use rights. These may 
be transferable. 
(iv) Extension of private property rights in an effort to eliminate the occurrence 
of the externality. 
 
Subsidising pollution reduction is an alternative to taxing pollution creation, and in 
theory, it can achieve the same degree of allocative efficiency. However, in contrast to 
taxation, subsidisation involves a charge on the state budget.  Moreover, it has the 
opposite income distribution consequences to taxation. Worrall (1995) argues that a 
subsidy to aquaculture, for example, for shrimp farming, may be justified because 
aquaculture is likely to reduce harvesting pressure in the capture fisheries. However, 
this is a controversial matter and it is clear that aquaculture does not always have this 
consequence (see Tisdell 1991, section 6.4). In fact, as pointed out above, just the 
opposite can occur. 
 
Marketing of pollution or environmental-use rights has recently captured the interest of 
many economists. In theory, this policy approach can have similar allocative and 
dynamic economic consequences to the pricing control methods just mentioned.  
Nevertheless, actual schemes for marketing such rights can vary greatly.  For example, 
depending upon how the rights are distributed, they may bring in little or no revenue for 
the state or considerable revenue.  In this regard compare the policy which allocates 
initial pollution rights free to existing stakeholders in the industry and allows recipients 
to market these with the method by which the state auctions or sells rights (available 
only for one year) taking account of the market.  The latter provides the state with 
revenue whereas the former method does not.  Nevertheless, agency costs, sometimes 
considerable, have to be met when marketing of pollution rights is adopted as a policy 
(Tisdell, 1997a, b). 
 
In the case of aquaculture, many environmental spillovers are site-specific or vary in 
their consequences according to their location.  In these circumstances, uniform rates of 
taxes, subsidies or prices for rights for environmental-use do not promote economic 
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efficiency (Tietenberg, 1974).  Thus, extra administrative costs are involved in 
adjusting these refer appropriately by regions or locations so reducing their value as 
regulatory instruments.  This is not to say that adjustments are impossible.  For 
example, marketed pollution rights may be designated for use in particular regions.  
However, in this case, it is possible that the market for such rights will become ‘thin’. 
 
As for the view of Coase (1960) that the strengthening of private property rights is 
likely to eliminate spillovers, this approach is only likely to be a success if the cost of 
enforcing those rights is low.  Unfortunately, in relation to aquaculture, especially if 
non-point pollution is involved, these (transaction) costs are usually quite high.  This 
limits the scope for private property solutions to environmental problems caused by 
aquaculture. 
 
The nature of most aquaculture is such that traditional economic pricing and market-
making approaches to pollution control and environmental use have limited application 
or can only be imperfectly applied.  This is not to say there is no scope for such 
regulations.  They may be used in controlling use of underground water, for example. 
Furthermore, if such methods are used, they often have to be modified to suit actual 
circumstances. For example, taxes or prices on using the environment may have to be 
varied according to the locality involved. Furthermore, the stage of economic 
development of a country can limit the practical use of instruments that are employed in 
more developed countries. 
 
 
7.  Prohibitions and Administrative-type Regulations 
Prohibitive and administrative-type regulations are usually not favoured by economists 
because their allocative and dynamic economic consequences are believed to be less 
favourable than pricing and market-making approaches to the control of environmental 
use.  However, the comparison is often made while ignoring the transaction costs 
involved in environmental pricing and market-making approaches to control of 
environmental use. When all costs are taken into account, prohibition and 
administrative type regulations will sometimes be the most economic means of 
controlling use of the environment. 
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The nature of such regulations can vary greatly as does their cost and overall 
effectiveness.  This may take the form of (1) emission standards (2) controls on inputs 
used in aquaculture (3) on stocking rates (4) preservation orders, for example, 
requirements that a certain amount of vegetation such as mangrove cover be retained 
and (5) zoning affecting the location and nature of operations of aquaculture farms and 
other enterprises. 
 
These methods need to be assessed by taking into account all the factors listed in Table 
2.  This means that alternative environmental policies should not be evaluated just in 
terms of their possible consequential economic effects. 
 
Some prohibitions can be costly to enforce whereas others may be relatively 
inexpensive.  For example, it is likely to be more costly to monitor compliance with 
emission standards than to enforce zoning regulations or maximum stocking rates of 
fish.  One has to balance the agency costs against their contributions otherwise to 
improving the overall level of economic welfare.  In reality, achieving a utopian or 
ideal solution to controlling environmental spillovers from aquaculture seems 
impossible. 
 
8.  Further Discussion of Sustainability Implications 
Traditional economic approaches to environmental regulation are based on social cost-
benefit analysis. Such analysis requires account to be taken of spillovers as well as 
private net benefits. While it is impossible to go into details here, a major issue raised 
by social cost-benefit analysis is how empirically to place economic values on the 
spillovers or externalities that arise. Where there is loss of marketed production or 
commodities because of such spillovers, measuring the economic loss arising from 
these can be straightforward, in principle. However, in some cases, aquacultural 
activities can affect the supply of non-marketed goods and the reduction in their supply 
will need to be valued.  Methods such as contingent valuation methods have been 
developed for this purpose, but they are not without their limitations (Tisdell, 1991, Ch. 
9). 
 
Some authors have suggested that because of the uncertainty involved in evaluation of 
environmental effects, systems of safe minimum standards should be adopted (Bishop, 
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1978, 1979). In some instances, such standards can be combined with the use of 
transferable pollution rights. A further modification to the traditional economic 
approach to environmental regulation has arisen from debate about sustainable 
economic development.  While most parties to the debate agree that externalities need 
to be taken into account to achieve sustainability, some parties believe that this is 
insufficient. These individuals argue that strong conditions need to be enforced to 
achieve economic sustainability. 
 
This group claims that it is now necessary to hold the world's remaining natural 
resource and environmental stock at approximately current levels (see Pearce, 1993).  
This means that any new economic activity should have a zero net effect on the 
environmental stock.  In relation to aquaculture, this approach may require zero net 
emissions of pollutants by an aquaculture farm, water recirculation and so on. In other 
cases, offset policies may be allowed. For example, where an aquacultural development 
destroys a natural wetland, the developers may be required to establish an artificial 
wetland, at least equivalent environmentally to the one destroyed. Alternatively, 
artificial or augmented natural wetlands may be required to be established to help 
process effluents from aquaculture farms. 
 
In the 1990s, in Queensland, Australia, introduced legislation intended to force 
aquaculture farms to have zero net emissions of nitrogen and phosphorous in their 
wastewater. But the standard could not be achieved. Furthermore, the question arises of 
whether such stringent standards are desirable, even if they can be physically and 
biologically achieved. The ad hoc promulgation of such rules can certainly add to 
economic costs and create economic inefficiencies. Furthermore, there could be some 
circumstances in which the release of nutrient-enriched water adds to the natural 
environmental resource stock and so creates a positive externality. 
 
Economists have traditionally suggested that when environmental spillovers are 
optimally regulated, some degree of spillover or pollution is likely to be optimal from 
an economics viewpoint. Nevertheless, strong sustainability-advocates may call for a 
zero net environmental effect. Their main argument is that aggregate stocks of natural 
environmental capital are now at critically low levels. Any further reduction is likely to 
endanger the welfare of future generations. 
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9.  Concluding Comments 
As pointed out, aquaculture is a rapidly expanding ‘new frontier’ industry, and has the 
ability to add considerably to material income and wealth But that also raises the 
question of whether its development is liable to be sustainable. It was shown that lack 
of sustainability of aquaculture development is sometimes a desired alternative even 
when market failure does not occur. Nevertheless, some concerns have been expressed 
about resource choices in such cases that adversely impact on sustainability. There is, 
however, less controversy about the fact that adverse environmental spillovers can 
result in income or economic paths being followed that are less sustainable than 
socially preferred and available alternative paths. This discussion is specifically linked 
to environmental spillovers arising from aquaculture. 
 
Particularly in the case of environmental spillovers from aquaculture, of what policies 
can and should be adopted to regulate these spillovers so as to increase economic 
welfare and contribute to sustainable development. A considerable number of policy 
instruments for regulating such spillovers were shown to exist. However, it seems that 
no single policy instrument or class of instruments constitutes the best choice in all 
circumstances. 
 
Although economists favour pricing and market-making methods of regulation because 
of their favourable economic consequences, when all costs are taken into account, there 
can be circumstances where these methods are not the best available.  As a rule, one has 
to select the best amongst imperfect methods of regulation and the appropriate type of 
regulation or combination of regulations is likely to vary with the cases requiring 
attention.  For this reason, policy-making in aquaculture cannot be a mechanical affair.  
Furthermore, it has become more complicated with growing interest in conditions 
required for sustainable development.  There is still much to be learnt about appropriate 
economic ways to satisfy strong conditions for sustainability. Nevertheless, the 
continuing importance of environmental assessment, planning and management of 
aquaculture development for sustainable development has been underlined by FAO 
(1995).  
 
Unfavourable externalities are generated by many social and economic activities.  
Aquaculture is both a source and a victim of several of these spillovers. Such 
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externalities threaten sustainable development and often are sources of economic 
inefficiency and market failure. Their control can help to sustain economic 
development and improve the ability of economies to satisfy human wants. However, 
economic regulation is not costless and different policy instruments often have different 
side effects, some of which may be unwanted.  Furthermore, their impact can vary 
depending on the attribute of production to which they are applied, for example, to 
inputs, outputs, emissions, etc. Consequently, the assessment of alternative economic 
instruments for regulating environmental spillovers from aquaculture are much more 
complicated than some economists and non-economists have led us to believe. In 
assessing alternative policy instruments for control of spillovers from aquaculture, 
account must be taken of the comparative agency costs involved in each and limitations 
on the knowledge available to policy-makers. These, and other factors, influence the 
practicality of using the available alternative policy instruments as a means to support 
sustainable development. 
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